University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiCen

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

11-11-1988

Interview: Mario Solarzano Martinez, Secretary Of
Democratic Socialist Party, Guatemala
Deborah Tyroler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen
Recommended Citation
Tyroler, Deborah. "Interview: Mario Solarzano Martinez, Secretary Of Democratic Socialist Party, Guatemala." (1988).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen/2542

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 073996
ISSN: 1089-1560

Interview: Mario Solarzano Martinez, Secretary Of
Democratic Socialist Party, Guatemala
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, November 11, 1988
[Summarized below are highlights from a recent interview with Mario Solorzano Martinez,
Secretary of Guatemala's Democratic Socialist Party, published by the Regional Coordination
for Economic and Social Research of Central America and the Caribbean-CRIES (Managua).
(The interview was republished in an 10/05/88 report by CRIES.)] Interviewer: What is the role
of the Democratic Socialist Party in Guatemala at present? Solorzano: Domestically, [President
Vinicio Cerezo's] Christian Democrat party has presented as its basic working thesis what they
call "concertacion." Part of our problem today is the outcome of the absence of a clear concept of
concertacion. This "thesis" for the Christian Democrats has become...whatever type of negotiation
the government participates in with a specific group putting pressure on it. Concertacion does
not exist in reality, understood in terms of a social pact toward creating agreements among the
country's major social actors or groups to resolve conjunctural and long-term socio-economic
problems. Concertacion under the Cerezo government has been managed in the form of unilateral
negotiations with the private sector on the one hand, and with the workers on the other. The
government has compromised itself with both groups on different points. Perhaps the common
denominator of both sets of negotiations has been the government's failure to fulfill its part of
the accords. The so-called concertacion has been transformed into a type of boomerang, which
instead of enhancing the government's credibility and trustworthiness has produced precisely the
opposite. Thus, the Guatemalan political situation today can be characterized by a widespread
lack of confidence in the seriousness of the government toward fulfilling any type of agreement.
This crisis of confidence, in turn, has reduced the potential for domestic stability. The crisis of
confidence was expressed on May 11 with the attempted coup. It demonstrated that although the
government was capable of winning elections, no one stood up to defend the government or the
democratic process. In civil society, the feeling does not exist that the democratic process has been
favorable to average Guatemalans' interests, nor is there a feeling that citizens are obligated to
defend it... Add to this the despair of the traditional rightist sectors, whether economic, military
or political. They believe that the democratic process conspires against them: to the extent the
process advances, they lose the possibility of once again gaining power via elections. Consequently,
the traditional right has opted for a phase of conspiracies, which is what took place on May 11.
The crisis of confidence does not have an immediate solution, since the government has not yet
offered a clear policy to gain popular support, and because the Army continues to be divided on
how to end the war with the guerrillas. Some believe the war can be termined by political means,
and others countenance only a military solution. Personally, I believe there will be no solution to
Guatemala's major problems as long as the war is not resolved, and serious definitive accords are
not developed. These accords are needed not only to resolve the immediate economic situation, but
also toward defining a plan for a future economic model. Inter.: To what point are such proposals
viable, assuming the military continues acting as the real power behind the throne? Solorzano: The
country has gained in this democratic process in that today the military is part of it. This is not a step
backward...[C]onditions exist to hammer out broader accords in which undoubtedly the military
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will be a participant. The military will continue as a major factor in power relations as long as the
war exists, and beyond... I believe that possibilities exist for finding solutions. What happens is that
the government does not have a clear concept of what the [democratic] transition consists of. It has
attempted to please everyone without differentiating among its friends and enemies. For instance,
after May 11 the government decided to extend concessions to the perpetrators of the coup. Instead,
the government could have taken advantage of the moment to bring together those social sectors
who support the democratic process in order to...disarticulate the government's enemies. Inter.:
Can you describe your party's analysis of the current political scene? Solorzano: ...Most political
expression in Guatemala is center to rightwing. The right is in a state of crisis, the outcome of a
rupture with "traditional theories." I believe that in the 1990 electoral campaign we will see five or
six candidates from the center to the right. On the left, the problem of factionalization is reduced.
Regarding the legalized left, the PSD is, undoubtedly, the most representative force. There are other
smaller leftist groups, some connected with the PSD and some not, ranging from slightly left of
center to the guerrillas who are far removed from legality. Of all political groups, I would dare to
say that 75 or 80% are with the [democratic] process and against a coup attempt. Only the purest
expressions of the right seek military conspiracy. Regarding the private sector, a large proportion of
businesspersons are not interested in a coup, but are also not in agreement with the government.
Their reasons for distaste vis-a-vis the government are curious, since the Cerezo administration
has effectively favored them with its application of neoliberal [economic] policies. In this regard, I
have coined a phrase: "This is a government of the right, but which does not like the right." On the
other hand, the trade union movement has greatly recuperated. The greatest organizational push
has occurred in the countryside,...which has included spontaneous actions. Such spontaneity can
be dangerous, however, since it can go in any direction. As a result, the PSD has sponsored efforts
to encourage the creation and growth of the Rural Workers Central (Central de Trabajadores del
Campo). The Central possesses a broad-based vision, with the understanding that diverse interests
and demands exist in the countryside. In the cities, a resurgence of union organizing has developed,
particularly in the trade unions of service workers, that is, among public employees where trade
union strength is greatest. The government has sought to control these unions, generating divisions
and internal struggles. The public employee union movement continues, however, to be the most
important trade union force. Inter.: Among Guatemala's most critical problems are agricultural land
tenure and production systems...What has the movement led by Fr. Andres Giron accomplished,
for instance? Solorzano: This movement is an expression by landless peasants that has emerged
with a link to the Christian Democrats. This link is not an organic one, but exists rather in terms of
the support given by Fr. Giron to the party in the campaign, and of tacit agreements with President
Cerezo. The link with the Christian Democrats is falling away because President Cerezo makes
offers, but then fails to fulfill his pledges. This obligates Fr. Giron to promote greater struggle, while
it also generates expectations and pressure from below that place him in confrontation with the
state. Everyday the peasant movement gains greater mobilization capacity, although it is burdened
with serious difficulties ranging from the government's failure to fulfill its promises to problems of
conceptualization as to how to manage land redistribution, etc. In global terms the tacit relationship
between the agrarian movement and the Christian Democrats has nurtured a paternalistic vision
on the government's part. Such vision does not address two vital problems: the landless peasantry
needs land; and, peasants who occupy land but lack legal title who need titles. The latter live
in constant insecurity that their land will be taken from them. Under a constitutional mandate,
resources have begun to arrive in the countryside, such as the 8% assigned to municipalities. These
resources have had an impact in the country's interior. For the first time, the municipalities are
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managing money. There is a promotion madness in the interior where one encounters promoters
of health, [potable] water, development, everything. The Christian Democrats have this approach
to the countryside, i.e., resolving small problems, and this has had an impact. Inter.: But what about
agrarian reform? Solorzano: The Christian Democrat government has no intention of using even
the words "agrarian reform." The land question continues to be the major problem. From our
perspective agrarian reform is the spine of our program, but experience is not demonstrating that
we are clear on what we are going to do. It is not simply a matter of offering ideas. The complexity
of Guatemala is very great. For instance, in some places the principal demand is land, while in
others it is a policy for legalization of land titles. In still others, the problem is one of [economic]
development. One must have a sufficiently clear grasp of this panorama of demands and needs to
avoid becoming involved in counterproductive adventures. Inter.: What has occurred [since Cerezo
became president] regarding counterinsurgency policies in the countryside, strategic hamlets, etc.?
Solorzano: The results are varied...We must be clear that the strategic hamlets are part of a war
strategy that is not going to disappear as long as the war continues. It is absurd to think that the
military will grant concessions regarding its [war] strategy when it has been successful. At present,
the problem has been formulated more in terms of how to end the war. Being realists, we must
be clear that seeking a solution to the war is necessary, and that it is not visible on the immediate
horizon with any clarity. But there are a series of national and international conditions that make
war as a metholodogy of power less legitimate, less worthy of support. Objective and subjective
conditions have changed, in the sense that a favorable position toward war does not exist. However,
it continues to exist as a problem. The solution is not necessarily a dialogue between the government
and the guerrillas, because conditions for such dialogue, a dialogue on power, do not exist. It is
a situation in which political conditions do not favor the insurgency, nor do the guerrillas have
the military capability to impose negotiations. In the case of El Salvador which all of us recognize
as representing greater potential for negotiations, and where part of the opposition has returned
to participate in legal forums of struggle , arranging dialogue has been difficult. In Guatemala,
where the guerrillas have less military capabilities, and most members of the political opposition
remain outside the country, the potential for negotiations does not appear on the horizon. Inter.:
But one could also argue that the Guatemalan situation is favorable to dialogue. Why then does the
government refuse to negotiate? Solorzano: Because there are other variables which come into play
such as conceptual ones within the army itself. They do not have a concept of a goal, discussion,
debate or a thesis of how to end a war which they describe as non- existent. Theirs is a narrow,
strictly military concept. This is part of the difficulties and contradictions which make negotiation
unlikely. Nor is there a concept of a goal on the part of the guerrillas. Our thesis as a party is that
it is first necessary to obtain a level of consensus among fundamental sectors of power, with the
objective of ending the war. This consensus must be grounded on an economic program; no other
way is viable. We believe that there are no possibilities of simply sitting down and stating that
disarmament occurs, an amnesty has been decreed and that everyone will return to legal political
life. Inter.: Surrender? Solorzano: It can be seen as surrender or not, but objective conditions for
negotiation are non-existent. Thus we must seek a mechanism, which in our opinion is a program
in which the problem is not power, but rather a societal one we describe as the country's new
historic democratic commitment. This implies reformulation of the development model and thereby
requires addressing topics such as agrarian reform, resources for education, health, etc., in which
the objective conditions for struggle disappear, on both sides. Inter.: But this implies a political will...
Solorzano: ...which today does not exist, but there are forces such as ours and others that would take

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 3 of 4

LADB Article Id: 073996
ISSN: 1089-1560

this position, including the Catholic Church, some persons in the private sector, and even some
within the military...

-- End --
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